Katie Coyne

Katie Coyne

Doctoral Fellow

Period at the center: October 2026 - May 2027

Research Project: The Communicability of Moral Belief

Email: kathryn_coyne@berkeley.edu

Website

Katie is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at University of California, Berkeley. She is writing a dissertation under the supervision of Andreja Novakovic and Daniel Warren on Kant’s notion of moral belief. In addition to her work on Kant, Katie also has a longstanding interest in Iris Murdoch’s philosophy and is working on a paper about Murdoch’s appropriation of Hegel’s notion of a “concrete universal.” Finally, Katie is also interested in Aristotle’s moral psychology. She is working on a paper about why Aristotle thinks that practical wisdom requires character virtue.

Research Project

The Communicability of Moral Belief

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops the notion of moral belief: belief which is grounded in the
adoption of an unconditionally necessary end (i.e., the fulfillment of the moral law). The first aim of my project
is to develop an interpretation of what Kant means when he suggests that moral belief is not communicable. With
reference to the “Canon of Pure Reason,” I argue that moral belief is not communicable because it is grounded
in the adoption of a moral disposition. I suggest that while all persons are capable of adopting a moral disposition,
the adoption of a moral disposition is neither something we can presuppose in another person, nor something
rationally compel by pointing some feature of a world which is already shared. Through attention to Kant’s
doctrine of the ‘primacy of pure practical reason,’ I argue that this interpretation need not imply that moral belief is
dogmatic, in the colloquial sense of the term, nor that the adoption of a moral disposition is arbitrary.
The second aim of my project is to assess the critical potential of Kant’s suggestion that moral belief is not
communicable, by putting this suggestion in dialogue with contemporary standpoint theory. I suggest that thinking
with Kant on the incommunicability of moral belief can help bring out what is plausible in standpoint theorist’s
suggestion that occupying a standpoint is required in order to have access to certain kinds of evidence.