Alexander Drusda

Research Project

Logic and Freedom in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

My dissertation, “Logic and Freedom in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” clarifies the precise role logical method plays in the development of Hegel’s practical and political philosophy. Virtually every commentator on the Philosophy of Right acknowledges Hegel’s insistence that logical method is “presupposed.” Yet there is considerable disagreement about what this presupposition amounts to, as well as how it bears on the success of Hegel’s project more generally. ‘Systematic’ readers of Hegel insist, alongside Hegel himself, that Hegel’s logical-metaphysical commitments (as elaborated in the Science of Logic) are required to arrive at the actual arguments Hegel makes in the Philosophy of Right. By contrast, so-called ‘non-systematic’ readers, who assess Hegel’s metaphysics as either outmoded, unconvincing, or cumbersome, argue that the Philosophy of Right is best understood on its own terms. There is an apparent ultimatum, then, between a pragmatic engagement with the text on the one hand, and faithful interpretation on the other.

In my dissertation research, I demonstrate that this ultimatum is merely apparent. I offer a “weak-systematic” reading of Hegel. My reading affirms that Hegel’s metaphysical commitments are prerequisite for understanding and evaluating the arguments of the Philosophy of Right. Yet I deny a common, stronger systematic claim that the success of these arguments depends entirely on the thoroughgoing success of Hegel’s Science of Logic. I address three aspects of the Philosophy of Right: practical philosophy, political philosophy, and philosophy of economics. In each of these domains, I demonstrate that only the weak-systematic reading (1) conforms to Hegel’s own understanding of the PR and (2) demonstrates that the PR remains a distinctive and relevant work of philosophy today.